Week 9 Notes
Alienation from Acculturating Norms, Contingency, and Irony

Part I: *Alienation* in, through, and about *language*

Today I want to talk about one of Hegel's most central and striking claims:
that ***modernity***, understood as having at its center the practical appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, essentially involves ***alienation***.
In the slogan I offered earlier:
Alienation is the worm in the apple of modernity.

Alienation in Hegel's sense **is *not* a psychological** matter.
It is a distinctively modern **structure of normativity**: specifically of the relation between normative **attitudes** and normative **statuses**.

1.   In the context of the modern acknowledgment of **the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, the contingency of attitudes undercuts**:
   a) On side of concepts, **rational bindingness** of norms
   b) On side of normative subjects, existential bindingness of them: **identification with some norms** as risk and sacrifice of, ultimately, life, or proximally, what one has actually made of one's life.
Both of these are aspects of ***alienation* from the acculturating norms that make us what we are by binding us in the sense of our being subject to assessment according to those norms**.

I'm going to talk about some contemporary philosophical manifestations of Hegelian alienation.

2.   Wittgenstein's problem, and his resolution compared to Hegel's:

[Mention Sabina Lovibond (one of McDowell's first students, in the book drawn from her dissertation: *Realism and Imagination in Ethics*) as an early, insightful appreciator of this strand of LW's thought.]

        I think **Wittgenstein**'s thought in this area begins with appreciation of the **contingency** of important aspects of our discursive practices.
        We inherit ways of using expressions that both are essential to their meaning what they do and show on their surfaces the marks of the contingencies that have shaped them.
        We find ourselves always already "thrown into" such a situation, and have no choice but to conduct our practical and theoretical discursive affairs against that in many ways arbitrary

background. This fact might be called "**semantic *Geworfenheit*,**" to use a Heideggerian metaphor.

I think Wittgenstein both

a) thinks that semantic *Geworfenheit* threatens our sense of the norms our discursive practices institute as **rationally binding** on us, in the sense of **providing genuine *reasons*** for applying expressions the way we do in novel cases (that is, that it is alienating), and

b) diagnoses this threat as resulting from **a residual misunderstanding of the discursive norms** that articulate what is a reason for what and so what our terms mean—how they are *correctly* used.

(Admittedly, talk of "rational bindingness" and even "reasons" is not LW's preferred mode of speech. I am characterizing his views in ways he would not, in order to bring out the similarities I see with Hegel's problematic.)

In particular, I think he objects to the way of thinking about **the division of labor between *instituting* discursive norms and *applying* them** that is implicit in seeing semantic *Geworfenheit* as threatening the intelligibility of understanding those discursive norms as governing our practice, in the sense of exercising authority that is genuinely binding on (sets a standard of correctness for assessments of) future uses.

The use of expressions, applying them in some circumstances and withholding application in others, **is all there is to institute the norms that govern such applications**.

The contingencies that turn out to be inherent in our adoption of normative attitudes are essential to their having the determinate contents they do. Any picture of discursive norms as answering to norms that are rational in a sense that excludes genealogical contingencies is an idealized fantasy, visible as such by its precluding the determinate contentfulness of those norms.

I take it that Wittgenstein is concerned both to point out our semantic *Geworfenheit*, and to show that it ought not to be understood as impugning the integrity of discursive norms, since it is essential to their determinate contentfulness. If we are to talk at all, we have no choice but to do so by engaging in practices whose implicit norms are as they are as **a result of contingent facts that don't *justify* talking as we do**. (As to the alternative, recall Sellars's dictum "Clearly human beings could dispense with all discourse, though only at the expense of having nothing to say."["A Semantical Solution to the Mind-Body Problem"])

Any account of discursive normativity that treats the fact of our semantic *Geworfenheit* as undercutting the legitimacy of those norms (that is, any alienating account), is to be rejected as incorporating an evidently mistaken metaphysics of normativity.

The proper response to this realization, Wittgenstein thinks, is not to construct some alternative positive metaphysical story, but simply to **acknowledge and embrace** discursive contingency and semantic *Geworfenheit*. We might call this recommended therapeutic meta-attitude "**semantic *Gelassenheit*,**" to continue the Heideggerian metaphor. (Though so used, the term owes more to Meister Eckhart's original usage than to Heidegger's radical adaptation of it.) Basically, it recommends that **we just get used to our *Geworfenheit***, rejecting theories according to which it is alienating, without adopting others in their stead.

According to this line of thought, the culprit responsible for the threat of alienation from the discursive norms that make our thought possible is outmoded metaphysical pictures of what would be required to justify those norms, to show them to be genuinely binding on us, to provide suitable standards for assessing the correctness of our attitudes. Rather than holding our practice up to Procrustean standards provided by *a priori* models of what rationality must be like—requiring for instance that reasons have the form of deductive derivations from noncontingent premises, or that they maximize utility in the light of subjective preferences and credences—we should accept that our discursive practices are in order as they are, and understand justification in terms of those semantogenic practices. So understood, the recommended *Gelassenheit* is a kind of pragmatism, in the sense of investing authority in our reason-giving practices, and taking our theories to be responsible to them, rather than the other way around.

Hegel anticipated Wittgenstein's social-practical understanding of discursive normativity. That is how he brings Kant's insight into the normativity of intentionality down to earth—in a suitably broad sense *naturalizing* it. And he foresaw the danger that appreciation of our normative semantic *Geworfenheit* poses for the intelligibility of discursive norms as genuinely binding on the attitudes of those who engage in practices of applying those norms. I have been claiming that that is the core of his concept of <u>alienation</u>: that the modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses (a matter of how discursive norms are instituted) undercuts the traditional *sittlich* practical appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes (a matter of how discursive norms are applied).

Hegel, too, rejects the conclusion that there is an ineluctable incompatibility here, and so rejects any and every metaphysics of discursive normativity that entails such an incompatibility. For him, these are accounts that operate with the concepts construed according to the categories of *Verstand*, which Kant brought to explicit flowering. One diagnosis he offers is that in Kant's hands the distinction between reasons and causes (articulating the overarching distinction between the normative and the natural) has been regimented and rigidified into a dualism. (As I am using the term, a distinction becomes a dualism when it is drawn in terms that make the relations between the distinguished items unintelligible.) In particular, it is of the first importance to Hegel that the contingent causes on which genealogical analyses show our discursive norms to be counterfactually conditioned are themselves features of prior applications of concepts. **In striking contrast to Wittgenstein's version of normative semantic *Gelassenheit* as theoretical quietism, Hegel offers a detailed systematic account of the process by which and in which actual, and therefore contingent, applications of concepts both institute norms governing such applications and acknowledge the authority of those norms**.

3.   <u>**Genealogy**</u> <u>as the theoretical expression of</u> <u>**alienation**</u>:
The problem of being able to explain occurrence of **believ*ings*** without recourse to the reasons or evidence for what is **believ*ed*.**

The "great unmaskers" of the 19th century: **Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud**:

What the genealogists dug down to is not just causes *distorting* our reasons, but causes *masquerading as* reasons. When what we fondly believe to be reasons are unmasked, all that remains is blind causal processes. Those processes have taken on the guise of reasons, but in fact yield nothing more than rationalizations. Genealogy in its most radical form seeks to dispel the *illusion* of reason.

As I shall use the term, genealogical explanations concern the relations between the *act* or state of believ*ing* and the *content* that is believ*ed*.
A genealogy explains the advent of a belief, in the sense of a believ*ing*, an attitude, in terms of contingencies of its etiology, appealing exclusively to facts that are *not* evidence, that do *not* provide reasons or justifications, for the truth of what is believ*ed*.

In this sense, when it occurs to the young person that he is a Baptist because his parents and everyone they know are Baptists, and that had he been born into a different community he would have with equal conviction held Muslim or Buddhist beliefs, that is a genealogical realization. As is evident already in this mundane example, the availability of a genealogical explanation for a constellation of beliefs can have the effect of undercutting its credentials as something to which one is *rationally* entitled. The genealogy asserts counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals linking the possession of certain beliefs (attitudes of believing) to contingent events whose occurrence does *not* provide *evidence* for (the truth of) what is believed.
If the believer had not had a bourgeois upbringing, were not driven by ressentiment, or had not had that childhood trauma, she would not have the beliefs about the justice of labor markets, Christian ethics, or conspiracy theories that she does. None of those events, upon which, the genealogist asserts, the holding of the beliefs in question are counterfactually dependent, provide *evidence* for what is believed.

For the particular vocabularies they address, all of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud offer natural histories of the advent of beliefs (believings) couched in those vocabularies—ones to which the rational credentials of the beliefs (what is believed) are irrelevant. Natural, causal processes of belief-formation are put in place of rational ones. To him who looks on the world reductively, the world looks reductively back. This movement of thought, too, comes with its native metanarrative of progress in understanding. Replacing *theological* necessity with *rational* necessity as the fundamental explanatory category is *disenchantment* of the world **by** reason. Replacing *rational* necessity with *natural* necessity is *disillusionment* **with** reason. From the genealogical point of view, the Enlightenment apotheosis of reason just substituted one ultimately supernatural self-delusion for another.

The Enlightenment was right to be impressed by the rise of the new science, to see it as requiring a thorough-going transformation of our understanding of our relations to our world. But from the genealogical point of view, it was insufficiently radical. It naturalized, and so disenchanted the world—but it did not disenchant *us*. The Enlightenment conception of the

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individual knowers and agents who brought about and were in turn transformed by the convulsions of modernity retains a spark of divinity, in the form of the faculty of reason. The genealogical movement of thought teaches by contrast that the *subjects*, and their relations to the objects they know about and act on, no less than those *objects* themselves, must be thoroughly naturalized.

But what about the normative "force of the better reason"? Is it, too, just an illusion arising from the play of natural forces? Or can it somehow be understood in terms of them? Can we really understand the natural science that is the source of genealogies of our believings itself entirely in naturalistic terms? Must we? In its most radical form, the genealogical thought is that *if* we can understand the etiology of our believings (and preferrings, intendings, and so on) in terms of *causes* that do not provide *reasons* for them, *then* talk of reasons is shown to be out of place: not only superfluous, but actively misleading. The metanarrative of genealogy as unmasking illusions of reason depends on the disjunction "causes or reasons" being *exclusive*, its forcing a choice on us. Genealogy turns Kant's distinction back on itself. It becomes a snake, poisoning itself by biting its own tail.

4.   **Harman** problem: Specific instance of genealogy.
Can explain moral attitudes just by appeal to other attitudes, without appeal to actual moral values.

        In the broad terms I have used to characterize it here, alienation is what happens when appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses makes theoretically and practically unintelligible the status-dependence of normative attitudes, that is, the *sittlich* appreciation of the genuine *bindingness* of norms. Metaethical moral relativism is a relatively straightforward, explicit version of this phenomenon, so described. For what moral norms are taken to be relative *to* is moral normative attitudes. This idea first becomes tempting with an anthropological understanding of the cultural diversity of normative attitudes as expressed in the various practices, traditions, institutions, and avowed beliefs of different groups. There evidently are substantial differences in what people practically *take* to be appropriate and inappropriate, obligatory and permitted. Whether or not this diversity of attitudes is treated as disagreement, the thought is not far off that there might be no fact of the matter determining one of these conflicting constellations of practical attitudes as correct.
        In particular, insofar as one thinks that moral normative statuses (what really is right or wrong) do not swing free of normative attitudes (in one expressivist tradition thought of as "sentiments") of praise or blame, approval or disapproval—that is, insofar as one appreciates the attitude-dependence of those norms or normative statuses—the systematic variation of attitudes with cultural circumstances undercuts the validity claims of any particular one.

        One argumentative route to such a relativist conclusion is particularly telling. Gilbert Harman argues that while the best explanation for attitudes about theoretical entities postulated

by natural science, for instance electrons, is that there really are such things, the best explanation of our moral attitudes need not postulate moral norms or values that they are attitudes towards. We can explain our attitudes by appealing only to other attitudes—for instance, those of our parents, teachers, and other interlocutors. We can explain how and why we acquire moral attitudes, and the role they play in our lives, in a way that is insensitive to whether there really are normative statuses of actually *being* responsible, obliged, or permitted, invoking only attitudes of *taking* ourselves and each other to be responsible, obliged or permitted.

5.   All this as modern **alienation**, expressed in *ironic* **attitudes**:
Attitudes are authoritative w/res to norms, and (so) are not responsible to them. We act "as if" there were the norms that our normative attitudes (acknowledging and attributing responsibility) are attitudes *towards*.

Q: Why "irony" as a way of talking about alienated attitudes?
A: Hegel is picking up—and cleaning up—Friedrich Schlegel's central conception of <u>irony</u>:

There are two threads in Schlegel's use of "irony" [Ironie] that seem of particular significance to Hegel. (Elsewhere, Socratic irony is important, too.)

a) In a note written around 1800 Schlegel recorded his dissatisfaction with Kant's conclusion that the question about the infinity of the world is a meaningless and empty one for human reason: "**The Antinomies should not have moved Kant to give up the infinite |das Unendliche~, but the principle of non-contradiction--.**"
 for example in the note from 1797 which states: "Every sentence, every book that does not contradict itself is incomplete--" (KFSA 18:83), or in the Athenaum Fragment 39:

Most often, the name Schlegel gives to the situation in which the principle of non-contradiction is defied is "irony." In contrast to the view adopted by rhetorical treatises at least since Aristotle, irony is not understood here as the rhetorical convention that allows the speaker to express something by saying its opposite, and the interpretation of the ironic discourse does not consist simply in turning the "literal" statement upside down to obtain the "intended" meaning: irony is the simultaneous presence of two meanings between which it is not possible to decide. Such, for example, is the view put forth in **the definition of irony as "analysis of thesis and antithesis**" (KFSA 16:154), where "analysis" is presumably to be understood not in Kant's but in Fichte's sense as "the procedure by which one looks for the characteristic in which the compared entities are opposed |entgegengesetzt~."(2) A better known and more extensively argued condemnation of the traditional, one-sided view of irony is found in the Lyceum Fragment 108:

b) In the much quoted posthumous fragment that defines: "**Irony is a permanent parabasis |eine permanente Parekbase~--**" (KFSA 18:85). As is well known, **the parabasis is the part in Old Attic comedy in which the chorus temporarily steps out of the linear**

development of the plot of the play and, turning around to face the audience, addresses it directly, making reference to contemporary public figures and events. In Schlegel's own definition, it is a speech addressed to the people that the chorus delivered in the middle of the play in the name of the poet. It was really a complete interruption and breaking off of the play, in which, as in the play itself, reigned the greatest lack of restraint, and the chorus, stepping out all the way to the edge of the proscenium |das bis an die Grenze des Proszeniums heraustretende Chor~,would say the rudest things to the audience (Geschichte der europaischen Literatur, KFSA 11:88).[1]

6.   **Language** as medium of recognition and legitimation:

Once it is practically understood that genuine authority and responsibility depends on its acknowledgment by others *as* legitimate (a matter of their recognitive attitudes, essential to the institution of normative statuses), the issue **of *legitimation* of claims to normative status** comes to the fore.
And *language* is the medium of legitimation: the expressive medium in which reasons are given and demanded.
Hegel's slogan is that in modernity, ***language* becomes the *medium of recognition***.
Recognition now has a *thematized* aspect, corresponding to *pure* consciousness.
This is that one' assent must be earned or won by reasons.

The motor of that project is the burgeoning significance of self-conscious individual subjectivity. A principal manifestation of that self-consciously new form of self-consciousness **is the felt need for the theoretical *legitimation* of the norms by which moderns find themselves acculturated**.
The mere existence of inherited normative structures is no longer accepted as sufficient warrant for them.
Entitlement to the acquiescence of individuals to institutionalized constellations of authority and responsibility is conditioned on the provision of **sufficient reasons justifying** those arrangements to those subject to them. The demand for their theoretical legitimation is an important dimension along which in modernity the authority of normative statuses answers to the attitudes of those bound by the norms in question.

The fact that **it is a hallmark of modernity that normative force is understood to depend on the possibility of a legitimating *account* expressing a rationale for it** underlines a key feature characteristic of the modern form of *Geist:* for it, ***language* becomes the medium of recognition**. Their specifically linguistic expression is now an essential aspect of recognitive attitudes of attributing and acknowledging normative statuses.

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[1] From Georgia Albert "Understanding irony: three essais on Friedrich Schlegel," [1993]

The need for rationalization and legitimation of norms stems from the appreciation of the role of the *attitudes of others* to the institution of genuine norms: they must *recognize* one's normative status.

One upshot of the dialectic of Master and Slave is that genuine recognition cannot be coerced. It requires *persuasion*. [BB: But how does this argument go, exactly?]

We can understand the *alienation* from our norms that is inherent in modernity only in terms of the deformations of language that express it. It is an essential, principled part of Hegel's general methodology to understand what is implicit in terms of its explicit expressions—to think of those expressions as essential to the identity of what is implicit. In this particular case, its specifically *linguistic* expressions are essential to alienation as a distinctively modern metaphysical normative structure. That is so precisely because alienation is at base a pathology of legitimation, undercutting the bindingness of norms. As such, it is rooted in the demand for a linguistically explicit account of the nature and rationale of the bindingness of the norms that make us what we are, in the light of an appreciation of the sense in which we make them what they are.

Language [Sprache], Hegel tells us repeatedly (at [*PG* 652, 666]), **is the *Dasein* of *Geist:*** its concrete, immediate being. Modernity is the age of alienated *Geist,* and "[t]his alienation takes place solely in language, which here appears in its characteristic significance." [*PG* 508]

7.   Actual and Pure Consciousness:
Hegel distinguishes two aspects of normative structure of the modern world of culture: *actual* consciousness and *pure* consciousness.

a) **Actual consciousness** comprises social institutions, the norms they embody, and individuals playing roles and engaging in practices governed and articulated by those norms. By applying those norms in their practice, individual subjects make them actual and efficacious; they actualize the norms. The norms and the individuals acting and assessing their actions according to those norms collectively *constitute* the institutions, giving them, as well as the norms, actual existence. To *act* according to the norms is to appeal to these in one's practical deliberations about what to do. Similarly, to *assess* according to them is to appeal to those norms—the ones implicit in custom—as standards in assessing one's own and others' performances. This is for one's attitudes to be governed by the norms in the dual sense that the norms provide standards for normative assessment of the attitudes and that the attitudes are subjunctively sensitive to the content of the norms.

b) The term "**pure consciousness**" is a way of talking about how the norms are understood theoretically: their explicit discursive articulation. Hegel says that pure consciousness "is both the thinking of the actual world, and its thought-form [Denken und Gedachtsein]." [*PG* 485]

It is the way normativity is *understood,* the theory that makes explicit the normativity implicit in the institutionalized practice of actual consciousness.

Pure consciousness is the way norms are conceived or conceptualized. Hegel's term for conceptual articulation—articulation by relations of material incompatibility and inference—is "mediation." So he says that pure consciousness *mediates* the relation between actual individual selves and the norms it theorizes about.

In traditional society, as opposed to modern culture, the norms implicit in *Sitte,* in customs, are *immediate*—not the subject of conceptualization or thematization, not made *explicit,* and hence not subject to critical scrutiny. Immediate *Sittlichkeit* has a purely practical, implicit, *nonconceptual* conception of norms, and so has no analogue of pure consciousness.

Pure consciousness is a distinctively modern form of self-consciousness, a manifestation of the rise of subjectivity. It is a new way the norms implicit in the practices of actual consciousness can be something explicitly *for* consciousness.

Where actual consciousness requires the adoption of *practical* attitudes toward the norms, applying them in practice by judging, acting intentionally, and assessing the claims and performances of others, pure consciousness requires the adoption of *theoretical* attitudes toward the norms.

Pure consciousness offers explicit accounts of the nature of the *binding force* and the source of the *content* of the norms.

8.	This is why there is no analogue of *pure* consciousness (only *actual* consciousness) in traditional society.

There disputes could take the form of arguing about who is the *true king* (cf. true Pope). Is that one a usurper? Is the historical claim of that branch of the family superior? Has the present king-in-fact shown himself not to be the true king by his bad behavior, so that the true king (the one who has the "mandate of heaven," as the Chinese have it) is really is nicer younger brother? What could *not* be conceived is that there *is* no true king, that there should not *be* kings.

Pure consciousness on the side of Faith only arises when challenged by pure consciousness in the shape of Enlightenment. Until then the theological debates are intramural (*which* confession, specifically?).

To be sure, the rise of Protestantism played a crucial role in preparing the ground for this development.

Part II: The Resolution of *Alienation* suggested in the model of *language*

9.   Language, Irony, and Freedom:

The deformations in that recognitive constellation of attitudes distinctive of alienation take the form of characteristic linguistic practices. In particular, they take the form of ironic relations between individuals and the culture-constituting norms, which are viewed as pious fictions. Modernity is characterized by a one-sided privileging of the authority of individuals and their acts and attitudes, construing them as independent of and authoritative with respect to the norms they fall under.

The fact that language has come to the fore as the recognitive medium in which conceptual normativity is articulated offers some guidance as to how the one-sidedness of the modern appreciation of the significance of subjectivity (alienation) can be overcome, without having to give up the insight that marks the shift from traditional to modern culture as an expressively progressive transformation of our self-consciousness. It sets criteria of adequacy for an unalienated, postmodern form of recognition.
For it means that our model for the articulation of *Geist* should be the relations among individual language users, their speech acts, the attitudes those speech acts express, linguistic norms, linguistic practices, linguistic communities, and languages.

Focusing on the linguistic character of modern recognitive processes—the practices of adopting specific recognitive attitudes—that is, of acknowledging and attributing conceptually contentful commitments, responsibilities, and licensings—provides a new perspective on the notion of <u>freedom</u>, which is characteristic of *Vernunft.*

Negative freedom is freedom *from* something: the absence of some sort of constraint. Positive freedom is freedom *to* do something: the presence of some sort of ability. In Kant's picture of the freedom characteristic of *geistig,* normative beings, the capacity that they have to commit themselves, to undertake responsibilities, is of a kind of positive freedom. They are able to do something that merely natural creatures cannot. Freedom for Kant is the capacity to constrain oneself by something more than the laws of nature—the capacity to constrain oneself normatively, by undertaking commitments and responsibilities, acknowledging authority, and so on.
        One way in which the model of language helps us think about the possibility of overcoming alienation, then, is that it exhibits an unalienated combination of the authority of individual attitudes and their responsibility to genuinely binding norms. For linguistic practice exhibits a social division of labor.

A classic, perennial, in some sense defining problem of political philosophy has always been to explain how and on what grounds it could be rational for an individual to accept some communal constraint on her will. What could justify the loss of negative freedom—the freedom from constraint—that you get by entering into a community and subjecting yourself to their norms, acknowledging the authority of those norms? One can easily see how that could be justified from the point of view of the community. Unless people act rightly and conform to the norms, there are lots of things the community cannot do. The challenge has been to say, how one could justify that loss of negative freedom, as rational on the part of the individual. Responses to this challenge form a favorite literary genre in the Enlightenment. (Hobbes and Locke are paradigmatic practitioners.)

Hegel saw in Kant's notion of positive freedom the possibility of a new kind of response to this challenge. In this context the fact that language provides both the medium and the model of recognition takes on a special importance. His idea is that some kinds of normative constraint provide a positive freedom, which, in Hegel's distinctive view, and moving beyond Kant, is *expressive* **freedom**. And the model for the exercise of that sort of freedom is talking.

Subsequent developments have put us in a somewhat better position to say what is promising about the linguistic model of positive freedom. Think to begin with about the astonishing empirical observation with which Noam Chomsky inaugurated modern linguistics— the observation that **almost every sentence uttered by an adult native speaker is a *novel* sentence. It is new, not just in the sense that *that speaker* has never produced or heard exactly that string of words before, but in the much stronger sense that *no one* in the history of the world has ever heard exactly that string of words before**. "Have a nice day" may get a lot of play, but for any tolerably complex sentence (a sentence drawn at random from this text, for instance), the odds of anybody having uttered it before (unless we are in quotation mode) approach the infinitesimal. This is an observation that has been empirically verified over and over again by examining large corpora, transcribing actual conversations, and so on. And it is easy to show on fundamental grounds. Although we do not have a grammar that will generate all and only sentences of English, we have lots of grammars that generate only sentences of English. If you look at how many sentences of, say, fewer than twenty-five words there are, even in the vocabulary of basic English, five thousand words (the average speaker may use twenty thousand), you can see that there has not been time for a measurable proportion of them to be uttered, even if everyone always spoke English and did nothing but talk. So linguistic competence is the capacity to produce and understand an indefinite number of novel sentences. Chomsky wanted to know how that is possible.

However the trick is done, being able to do it is a kind of positive linguistic expressive freedom. The fact is that **when you speak a language, you get the capacity to formulate an indefinite number of novel claims, and so to entertain an indefinite number of novel**

intentions, plans, and conjectures. That is a kind of **positive freedom** to make and entertain novel claims, things that could be true, or things one could commit oneself to making true.

One gets this explosion of positive expressive freedom, though, only by constraining oneself by linguistic norms—the norms one must acknowledge in practice as binding in order to be speaking some particular language. However open textured those norms may be, they involve genuine constraint. If one does not sufficiently respect the linguistic norms, then one ends up not saying, or thinking, anything at all. Of course, one need not say anything. One could just not ever say anything, though at the cost, as Sellars says, of having nothing to say. But the only way one can buy this positive, expressive freedom is by paying a price in negative freedom. One must constrain oneself by linguistic and conceptual norms. When one is speaking one's own language and not using fancy vocabulary, that constraint becomes invisible. It becomes much more visible when speaking in a language in which one is not fluent. The point here is that the way in which the language one does constrain oneself by becomes the medium in which one's *self* not only expresses, but develops itself is a paradigm of central importance for Hegel.

In the context of the essentially political, because social, account of the nature of normativity, **the paradigm of linguistic norms provides the form of an argument about how it could be rational to give up some kind of negative freedom, constraining oneself by norms**, making oneself and one's performances responsible to them (liable to assessment according to them) by practically acknowledging them as authoritative. For consider a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of trading off some minor negative freedom for **the bonanza of positive expressive freedom that comes with constraining oneself by linguistic norms.** (Any such assessment would have to be retrospective, of course, because anyone who has not yet made the deal is not in a position rationally to assess anything.) Can there be any doubt that the trade-off is worth it? Even though the beasts of field and forest are not in a position to make this argument, it seems clear that it would be rational for them to embrace this sort of normative constraint if they were.

Part of Hegel's thought about how we can move beyond modernity, and a lesson we should learn from the single biggest event in the history of *Geist,* is that **the positive expressive freedom afforded by engaging in linguistic practices, so subjecting oneself to constraint by linguistic norms, is the paradigm of freedom for normative, discursive beings like us, and that political institutions and the normative constraint they exercise should be justifiable in exactly the same way that conceptual linguistic ones are.**

In particular, every loss of negative freedom should be more than compensated for by an increase in positive expressive freedom. This is the capacity to undertake new kinds of commitments, new kinds of responsibility, to acknowledge and exercise new kinds of authority, all of which at once express and develop the self-conscious individuals who are the subjects of those new norms. This is a paradigm and measure of justifiable political constraint. This is how it

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can be rationally legitimated—even if only retrospectively, because the positive expressive freedom in question may not, as in the paradigmatic linguistic case, be prospectively intelligible. The demand is that every aspect of the loss of negative freedom, of the constraint by norms that individuals take on, be compensated for many times over by an increase in positive expressive freedom. The form of a rational justification for a political institution and its immanent norms is to show that it is in this crucial respect language-like.

[**Class Break here**]

Part III: Faith and Enlightenment

10.　　A quick prefatory word about Wealth vs. State Power: Hegel's prescient analysis of the two principal political institutions and interests, and how they look to each other.

The actualization of the substance of culture, its actual world, takes two different forms, those of Wealth and State Power.

It is the actions of self-conscious individuals in intentionally producing performances and assessing each other's performances that give whatever actuality there is to the norms and the institutions.

This is **applying norms** in the judgments and intentions that provide reasons for performances and in the assessment of reasons for performances.

The two sides of what Hegel calls "actual consciousness" accordingly correspond to **the two aspects of individuality: particularity and universality**.

- Wealth [Reichtum] is the thick institutional form in which the **particular** aspect of the certainty of individual self-consciousness is expressed by becoming actual or public, acquiring its truth in practical activity.
- State power [Staatsmacht] is the thick institutional form in which another the **universal** aspect of the certainty of individual self-consciousness is expressed or becomes actual or public, acquiring its truth in practical activity.

We have seen that the particular and universal aspects of self-conscious individuality correspond to the two structural elements necessary for social substance to be synthesized by recognitive relations: **the particular recognized and recognizing individuals, and the recognitive community comprising those individuals**.

All the components of actual consciousness in the form of Wealth—the norms, institutions, and self-conscious individuals who apply those norms and play roles in those institutions—are to be understood as articulating **the contribution to the institution and application of norms that is played by the recognitive activities and attitudes of particular self-conscious individuals**.

And all the components of actual consciousness in the form of State Power —the norms, institutions, and self-conscious individuals who apply those norms and play roles in those institutions—are to be understood as articulating **the contribution to the cultivation and acculturation of self-conscious individuals that is played by norms (universals) whose applicability is adjudicated by the recognitive community in whose practices they are implicit**.

Modern actual consciousness is **alienated** insofar as these two constitutive aspects of the recognitive process that produces both self-conscious individual selves and their communities stand in asymmetric relations of relative independence—that is, insofar as each side acts

practically as though its **authority** over the other were not balanced by a corresponding reciprocal **responsibility** to it.

We can appreciate the **irony** implicit in a structure in which the individual who actualizes each law sees the other as asserting complete independence of the universal precisely in the activities by which it actualizes the law it does acknowledge.

State power sees wealth this way. It represents the universal interests against the attempts of individuals, embodied in their use of wealth or activities as wealthy, to substitute private, individual purposes for public communal ones. It suspects the motives with which Wealth offers counsel to State Power.

Wealth sees state power this way. It sees state power exercised by individuals, and understands individuals as pursuing private and personal purposes, employing the institution of state power rather than those of wealth. It suspects the motives by which individual executives exercise State Power over Wealth.

Compare this to Creon and Antigone:

Like the individual agents who, as characters, embody and actualize the human and divine laws, the individuals acting for both of these institutions of alienation each in part (in counsel and in service) practically identifies with the universal as something whose identity above or independent of circumstance, and yet by acting at all also in part practically identifies with the disparity the deed involves, which appears immediately as the distinction between knowing and not knowing and acknowledges the universal as contingent or dependent on circumstance.

Both the individuals who exercise and actualize wealth and those who exercise and actualize state power display both the **acknowledgment of the *identity* of the universal** as expressed in the actions of individuals, and the **acknowledgment of the *disparity* of the universal** as expressed in the actions of individuals.

These are the recognitive attitudes Hegel calls the noble [edelmütige] consciousness and the ignoble [niederträchtige] consciousness.

Each social constellation is ignoble in adopting the attitude we shall come to recognize (in VIC) as playing the moral valet [Kammerdiener] to the other,

and each has its characteristic **acknowledgment of the claims of the *universal*, in counsel and service**.

Yet each attitude appears in its most highly developed form associated with just **one** of the social constellations. **Spirit is alienated into these two institutions, which confront each other across a formal gulf of perceived nobility, and do not recognize themselves in each other.**

Overcoming alienation will be moving from recognitive processes exhibiting this structure of immediate, asymmetric *independence* to ones exhibiting instead the mediated, reciprocal structure of *freedom*.

In the actual modern world of culture, which results from that acknowledgement, Wealth is the individual as having authority over the *application* of concepts, and State Power is the individual as being *responsible to* the conceptual norms.

The division of these, their conflict, is **the paradigmatic *institutional* form of alienation**.

11.   Faith:

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The division between Faith and Enlightenment is the paradigmatic *theoretical* form of alienation.

These passages about a core structure of Faith are a paradigm of how Hegel gives a metaphysical reading of religious imagery:

> Here, in the realm of faith, the first is the absolute being, spirit that is in and for itself insofar as it is the simple eternal substance. But, in the actualization of its notion, in being spirit it passes over into being for another, its self-identity becomes an actual self-sacrificing absolute being, it becomes a self, but a mortal, perishable self. Consequently, the third moment is the return of this alienated self and of the humiliated substance into their original simplicity. Only in this way is substance represented as spirit. [*PG* 532]
>
> These distinct beings, when brought back to themselves by thought out of the flux of the actual world, are immutable, eternal spirits, whose being lies in thinking the unity they constitute. [*PG* 533]

This is his reading of the actual significance and metaphysical meaning of the allegory of incarnation and the Trinity. (Similar accounts are found throughout his work, notably in the *Science of Logic.*) He thinks that the doctrine of the Trinity is really talking about the structure of *Geist*—that is, of social normative "substance"—and that the community and the norms that are implicit in the communal doings (its "essence") is what God the Father in the Trinity is the image of.

The substance is social substance synthesized by reciprocal recognition. That is the medium in which the norms inhere.

In the model, that is the language.

The interfusion of humanity and divinity in God the Son within the allegory stands for the actual individual speakers, who are bound and constituted as self-conscious individuals by those norms "passing over into being for another, becoming a self, a mortal, perishable, self." The relations between them—the way in which speakers and their utterances are what they are only by virtue of the linguistic norms that govern them, and the norms are only actualized by being applied to actual utterances by speakers and audiences—that is the Holy Spirit in the Trinity.

So we have:
* the universals or norms,
* their perishable incarnation raised above mere particularity, which is also the actualization of those norms in *attitudes*,
* and the relation between them in *individuality*.

The lesson Hegel draws is that the being of these spirits "lies in thinking the unity they constitute"—that is, in understanding his recognitive account of normativity and individuality in relation to biological particularity and normative universality.

It is a measure of the way he works that Hegel goes back and forth cheerfully between

- the *logical* vocabulary,
- the *theo*logical vocabulary, and
- the linguistic-*cum*-normative vocabulary for talking about these things.

The religious language is a *sensuous allegory* for the most fundamental metaphysical-logical idea Hegel has.

Thinking of the universal and particular elements of individuality (the divine and the human) as standing in *familial* relations is construing *mediation* under categories of *immediacy*. Universality is thought of as being a kind of *thing:* in many ways, like the things here, only somewhere else, over there, in a beyond ("jenseits," in a different ontological postal code than ours). In a corresponding and complementary approach, **Enlightenment construes universality and normativity as rationality**.

This good thought shows up only in alienated form, however, when rationality is then thought of as a matter-of-factual dispositional property that happens to be shared by some particular organisms or kind of organism—when our being *geistig* beings is put in a box with having opposable thumbs.

The lesson of the transition from *Perception* to *Force and Understanding* was that the universals, the conceptual relations of incompatibility and consequence that articulate facts and show up in the form of laws, should be understood not as a supersensible world of theoretical entities standing behind and ontologically distinguished from the objects that show up in sense, but rather as the implicit structure or articulation of them—the modal articulation of observable fact.

In the same way, here, that is the lesson we are supposed to learn here about what he insists is the common topic of Faith, under the heading of the religious absolute, and of Enlightenment, under the heading of reason.

Normativity, universality, is not to be reified into some kind of a thing, either over there (as God) or in individual human beings (as Reason), but rather as implicit in the articulation of individuals in a community, their recognitive interplay, and the utterances and attitudes that actualize and express the norms.

12.   Enlightenment's critique of Faith:

Enlightenment's critique of Faith is a three-pronged attack.
There is an *ontological* or *metaphysical* claim, an *epistemological* or *cognitive* claim, and a *practical*, moral, claim:

- The first is that Faith makes an *ontological* mistake. It thinks that something exists, when it does not. God is not in fact part of the furniture of the world. There just is no such thing—nor any such *kind* of thing.

- The *epistemological* objection of Enlightenment to Faith is that even if there *were* such an object or kind of object, we could not come to *know* about it in the way Faith claims to know about God. The *actual* epistemological grounds for belief in this absolute are prejudice, error, gullibility, confusion, and plain stupidity.
- Third, enlightenment accuses faith of bad intention or motivation, of practical errors of action, of immoral activity. The priests are accused of trickery, the pretense of insight and knowledge, and of using that as a means to amass power.

Diderot, speaking for the radical (Spinozist) Enlightenment (as opposed to the moderate Enlightenment of Locke and Leibniz)—as per Jonathan Israel:

"I won't be happy until **the last king is strangled with the guts of the last priest**."

(In case you thought our current politics were uniquely divisive.)

13.   <u>Assessing where Enlightenment is right and wrong about Faith</u>:

In the original, melodramatic allegorical picture of the transition from nature to spirit, the first Masters pulled themselves by their own bootstraps out of the muck of nature by being willing to **risk their biological lives for a normative status**, for a form of authority, to be recognized as having that normative status, by being willing to *die* for the cause. This is *identifying with* that normative status. The point of the allegory of the sacrifice of service and worship is, rather, to identify with the authority of the norms (the universal) by being willing to *live* for it, by submerging particular attitudes (beliefs and desires) in the communal norms. In that way, like the Master of the original allegory, believing consciousness succeeds in making itself something other than what it already was, constitutes itself as something more than that**. That existential self-constitution—institution of a normative status by adoption of an attitude—is what faith really consists in.**

The reason the criticisms of Faith by Enlightenment miss their mark, on this account, is that **the self-conception to which a community is in this way practically committed to realizing is not the having of a belief that could turn out to be radically false**. It does not stand in that sort of a relation to its world.

It is **a doing**—a *making* things be thus and so, not a *taking* them to be thus and so. It is a **recognition**, a kind of self-constitution, **not a kind of cognition**. What it is about, the truth that the certainty of the believer is answerable to, is not something distinct from the believer in the community; it is something that if all goes well, the believers *make* true of themselves. If not, the failure is practical, not cognitive.

"Faith, for the believer, is not an alien thing that is just found in him, no one knowing how and whence it came. On the contrary, the faith of the believer consists just in him finding himself as this particular personal consciousness in the absolute being, and his obedience and service consist in producing, through his own activity, that being as his own absolute being." [*PG* 566]

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But here Enlightenment is foolish. Faith regards it as not understanding the real facts when it talks about priestly deception and deluding the people. It talks about this as if by some hocus pocus of conjuring priests, consciousness has been pawned off with something absolutely alien and other to it in place of its own essence. It is impossible to deceive a people in this manner. Brass instead of gold, counterfeit instead of genuine money may well be passed off, at least in isolated cases. Many may be persuaded to believe that a battle lost was a battle won, and other lies about things of sense and isolated happenings may be credible for a time. But in the knowledge of that essential being in which consciousness has immediate certainty of itself, the idea of this sort of delusion is quite out of the question. [*PG* 550]

The language of belief is performative, establishing as well as expressing social normative relations—not just saying how things objectively are, independently of the attitudes of the believers involved.

What is constituted by Faith is a certain kind of self-conscious individuality. The recognitive account of self-consciousness tells us that this is possible only if a corresponding kind of **recognitive community** is instituted at the same time.
The religious community is established by individuals' reciprocal recognition of each other as serving and worshipping, which is to say as identifying with the norms through sacrifice of merely particular, subjective attitudes and interests of the individuals they would otherwise be. This recognitive relation Hegel calls "trust" [Vertrauen].
"Whomsoever I trust, his certainty of himself is for me the certainty of myself; I recognize in him my own being-for-self, know that he acknowledges it and that it is for him purpose and essence. [*PG* 549]
The second part of this passage puts three requirements for an attitude to count as trust. The trusting one must recognize her own being-for-self, her own self-conception, in the trusted one; the trusting one must correctly take it that that self-conception is acknowledged by the trusted one; and the trusted one must correctly take it that that self-conception is acknowledged by the trusting one also as her own. The first part of the passage says that when those conditions are met, the trusting individual counts as identifying with the trusted individual.

So there is **a kind of emergent identification-through-recognition** here, according to which identifying with the norms has the effect or significance of identifying with other individuals who also identify their individual selves with the norms. Identifying with (by sacrificing for) the norms, and recognizing other individuals as doing the same, is at once identifying with the communal side of *Geist*—the recognitive community in whose practices those norms are implicit—and also identifying with the other individuals whom one recognizes as undertaking the same identification.

In trust, everyone is identifying with the universal side of individuality—and thereby with others who also do so. The passage quoted earlier continues:

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Further, since what is object for me is that in which I recognize myself, I am for myself at the same time in that object in the form of another self-consciousness, i.e. one which has become in that object alienated from its particular individuality, viz. from its natural and contingent existence, but which partly remains therein self-consciousness, partly, in that object, is an essential consciousness. [*PG* 549]

The community synthesized by reciprocal recognition in the form of trust shows the way to the possibility of an unalienated community of self-conscious individuals. It does not yet constitute such a community, because the particularity of the actual individual self-consciousnesses that actualize the norms by their acts and attitudes (including their recognitive attitudes) is still slighted. Further recognitive progress is required to overcome alienation and move beyond the modern phase in the development of *Geist*.

Unalienated *Geist* requires further recognitive structure beyond trust as it is on offer here. But that the recognitive community have the structure of trust in this sense is one essential element of *Sittlichkeit* after the rise of modern subjectivity. What trust brings about is the "unity of abstract essence and self-consciousness," of the norms believing individuals identify with and those believers. That unity, Hegel claims, is "the absolute Being of Faith"—that is, the distinctive *object* of religious belief.

"The absolute Being of faith is essentially not the abstract essence that would exist beyond the consciousness of the believer; on the contrary, it is the Spirit of the community, the unity of the abstract essence and self-consciousness. It is the spirit of the community, the unity of the abstract essence in self-consciousness." [*PG* 549]

On his view, the real object of religious veneration, Spirit, is not a God in the form of a distinct thing that causally creates human beings, but the religious community that believers create by their recognitive identification with it and with each other.

That, after all, is the lesson of his reading of the real lesson of the Christian **Trinity**:

God the Father is the sensuously clothed image of the norm-governed community synthesized by reciprocal recognitive attitudes (having the structure of trust) among self-conscious individuals.

The spiritual dimension of human life, toward which religious believers properly direct their attention and respect, is **what must be added to merely natural *animals* to make us *persons***, self-conscious individual selves, agents and knowers, subjects of normative assessment. That is the discursive normativity implicit in the practices of a properly constituted recognitive community of language users.

Even though its achievement of a community exhibiting the recognitive structure of trust is a positive development, Faith, as Hegel describes it, is still an alienated form of self-consciousness.

It is in fact the activity of individuals that produces the community and its implicit norms.

Further, the relation of each believing individual to that for which it sacrifices and with which it identifies, the object of its veneration, is mediated by its relations to other recognized and recognizing individuals, via those recognitive attitudes.

But Faith insists that it stands in an *immediate* relation to absolute essence, and that the existence and nature of that essence is wholly *independent* of the activities and attitudes of believers. Whereas in fact

"[t]hat [the absolute Being of Faith] be the spirit of the community, this requires as a necessary moment the action of the community. It is this spirit only by being produced by consciousness, or rather it does not exist as the spirit of the community without having been produced by this consciousness." [*PG* 549]

Its norms are actually the product of its practical recognitive attitudes.

Modernity is right about that.

Faith does not understand itself this way.

Hegel has been telling us what the object of Faith is *in* itself, not what it is *for* the kind of self-consciousness in question. He is describing for us the referent that they pick out (address themselves to) by means of misleading senses (conceptual contents), the noumena behind the phenomena of religious worship and service.

In this respect, Enlightenment is right in its criticisms of Faith. It does seriously misunderstand its object, which is not (as Faith thinks), an objective, independent being, but a product of its own thought and practice. (Making a mistake of this kind is what in Marx's anthropological allegory is called "fetishism.")

"It is just this that Enlightenment rightly declares faith to be, when it says that what is for faith the absolute Being, is a Being of its own consciousness, is its own thought, something that is a creation of consciousness itself." [*PG* 549]

Faith seeks to ground its recognitive and practical activities in knowledge of facts—that is, to give an objectivist metaphysical grounding for the bindingness of these norms.

That meta-attitude is carried over from traditional society: thinking of the norms not as the products of our activity, but as something merely found in the way the world anyway is. Where for the Greeks the norms had been part of the natural world, for Faith they are part of the supernatural world. But that is a specific difference within a general agreement that norms are grounded in ontology and matters of fact, in something about how the world just is antecedently to its having human beings and their practical attitudes in it.

Those norms and their bindingness are not understood as products of human attitudes and activity, though they in fact are instituted by people acting according to the pure consciousness of faith.

Believers institute these norms by their attitudes, but they do not understand themselves as doing that. Faith has not embraced the fundamental, defining insight of modernity: the attitude-dependence of normative statuses.

Faith and Enlightenment each has both a **cognitive, theoretical** dimension and a **recognitive, practical** dimension.

- Faith is *wrong* in its *cognitive* attitudes, misunderstanding its object and its relation to that object.
- But it succeeds with its *recognitive practices*, creating a community of trust.
- Enlightenment is right in its *cognitive* attitudes, correctly seeing that the normativity both are concerned with is not something independent of our attitudes and activities.
- But it fails on the *recognitive, practical* side.
- Because it creates a community with the reciprocal recognitive structure of trust, Faith acknowledges norms that can have some determinate content; they are contentful norms because a community like that can actually institute, sustain, and develop determinately contentful conceptual norms.
- But Enlightenment creates no such community.
- On the cognitive side, it sees that contentful norms cannot simply be read off of the way the world simply is, independently of the attitudes, activities, practices, and capacities of the creatures who are bound by them. Rationality is a human capacity.
- But Enlightenment is stuck with a purely formal notion of reason. It can criticize the contents Faith purports to find, but cannot on its own produce replacements.

14.   Enlightenment Utilitarianism as alienation:

Enlightenment acknowledges, as Faith does not, that both the binding force and the determinate content of conceptual norms depend on the activity of self-conscious individual knowers and agents. Its disenchanted, objective natural world does not come with a normative structure. The phenomena of authority and responsibility are a human imposition, the product of our attitudes and practices. Enlightenment manifests its alienation by developing its understanding of the norms in a way that is as one-sidedly subjective as Faith's is one-sidedly objective. The ultimately unsatisfactory result is **Enlightenment utilitarianism**, which construes the normative significance of things as consisting in their usefulness to us.
"Utility" here is allegorical for the role things play as objects of practical attitudes.
This view radicalizes the insight that **conceptual norms are not independent of the attitudes and activities of self-conscious individuals who apply those concepts in judgment and intention** ("The Useful is the object in so far as self-consciousness penetrates it." [*PG* 581]), by turning it into the view that norms are simply reflections of the particular, contingent purposes of individual self-consciousnesses. In Hegel's terms, the principle of utility identifies what the norms are in themselves with what they are for consciousness.

The term "Utilitarianism" is now usually used to refer to the sort of moral theory given its classical shape by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

The term typically used to refer to the extension of that way of thinking from the practical realm to the theoretical realm of theories of meaning and truth is "**pragmatism**."

Hegel sees a trajectory of thought that begins with the extrusion of subjective values from an objective world of facts, and ends with an identification of all properties and facts as purpose relative, an understanding of the truth of claims as conduciveness to the success of the practical enterprises of individuals.

"Alienation" is his term for the common practical conception of (attitudes toward) authority and responsibility ("independence" and "dependence") that underlies, motivates, and necessitates **the oscillation between one-sided objectivism and one-sided subjectivism**.

When that alienated practical conception is made theoretically explicit, he calls it "Verstand."

Hegel's overall philosophical aim is to give us the metaconceptual tools to get beyond the ways of understanding norms that require us to choose between taking them to be genuinely binding on individual attitudes because objectively there, antecedently to and independently of any such attitudes, on the one hand, and taking them to be mere reflections of those subjective attitudes, on the other. Thinking in terms of the categories of *Vernunft* instead of *Verstand* is to enable us to overcome not only the naïve, dogmatic ontological objectivism about norms of the tradition, but also this sort of utilitarian pragmatism—quite distinct from the sort of pragmatism I have argued Hegel endorsed—with its ironic distancing from the genuineness of the binding force of the norms, which has been the modern culmination of the rise of subjectivism.

Hegel thinks the practical stakes riding on this enterprise are high. When pure consciousness in the form of Enlightenment is the self-understanding of actual consciousness in the institutional form of State Power (the practical recognitive expression and actualization of a theoretical cognitive view), the result is **the Terror**, whose epitome is **the final bloodthirsty death throes of the French Revolution**.

Consciousness has found its Notion in Utility . . . from this inner revolution there emerges the actual revolution of the actual world, the new shape of consciousness, absolute freedom. [*PG* 582]

Norms that are products of subjective attitudes are practically understood as unable to constrain those attitudes.
A purely formal notion of reason offers no determinate content.

The state is understood on the model of a particular individual self-consciousness—distinguished only in that the will of that consciousness (the "will of the people"), its commitments, are taken as binding on every individual. Thus individuals are obliged to identify with and sacrifice themselves for that will. But this sort of purely formal recognition relation—each citizen recognizing himself in the will or all, the common will—cannot in fact institute a determinately

contentful common will. That would require that the particular subjective commitments of the individuals have some sort of authority over the universal, the common will. The result, he thinks, must be a content-vacuum, which can be filled only by the subjective attitudes and inclinations of some despotic individual—in much the same way as in the realm of abstract legal personhood. **Absolute Terror is what happens when the authority of individual self-consciousness to institute norms is conceived and practiced as unconstrained by correlative responsibility—as a matter of independence without correlative dependence.**

15.   **Conclusion**, looking forward:

"Giving contingency the form of necessity":
Contentful norms require **incorporation of particularity and contingency** in the form of necessity (normative force) and universality (conceptual content) through recognitive relations of reciprocal authority and responsibility articulated not only *socially,* but also *historically,* in the form of **constraint by a recollected *tradition***.

Understanding that there are no norms wholly independent of the attitudes and practices of individual self-consciousnesses is *modern*;
understanding that authority of attitudes over statuses on the model of unconstrained, pure independence (asymmetrical recognition) rather than freedom is *alienated*.
Any such conception is bound to oscillate between seeing the norms as not constraining attitudes because they are **contentless**, and seeing them as not constraining attitudes because their content is **arbitrary**, contingent, and particular, hence irrational, derived from the contingent attitudes, interests, and inclinations of some particular subject.
That is an *ironic* **attitude** toward the norms.

Faith and Enlightenment are each **one-sided** appreciations of the true nature of **norms in relation to attitudes**:
- Faith is on the *right* track on the practical *recognitive* dimension of self-consciousness,
- but has the *wrong* theoretical *cognitive* take on the side of consciousness.
- Faith is *right* in what it *does:* to *give* the norms determinate content by building a recognitive *community*. It builds a *community of trust,* which can *develop* and *sustain* determinately contentful norms.
- It is *right* to see that its relation to the norms should be one of *acknowledgment* and *service.*
- It is *wrong* to think that private conceptions and concerns must or even can be totally sacrificed to make that possible.
- Faith is *wrong* to take over the traditional immediate conception of its relation to the norms: to reify, ontologize, and in a sense naturalize them by objectifying them. It does not recognize itself in those norms it identifies with, in that it does not see them as its own product. Neither its

community nor its individual activities are seen as *essential* or as *authoritative* with respect to those norms.

- Enlightenment is *right* that the norms depend for both their force and their content on the attitudes and practices of the very individuals who become more than merely particular, natural beings by being acculturated—that is, by being constrained by those norms.
- It is *wrong* to think that all we contribute is the *form.*
- And it is *wrong* in the practical *recognitive* consequences of its insight into our authority over the norms.
- It is *right* in its criticism of Faith's metaphysics,
- but *wrong* to think that undercuts its form of life.

What is needed is to combine the humanistic *metaphysics* of Enlightenment (with its theoretical cognitive emphasis on the contribution of the activity of individual self-consciousnesses) with the *community of trust* of Faith (with its practical recognitive emphasis on the contribution of the activity of individual self-consciousnesses through acknowledgment of, service to, and identification-through-sacrifice with the norms).

The recipe for moving to the third, postmodern phase in the development of *Geist* is to bring together the *cognitive* and *recognitive* successes of Enlightenment and Faith.

The key to doing that is appreciating the role *recollection* plays in both cognition and recognition.

- **When *cognitive* activity takes the form of *forgiving recollection*, it institutes semantic *representational* relations between knowing subjects and the objects known.**
- **When *recognitive* activity takes the form of *forgiving recollection*, it institutes communities with the normative structure of *trust*.**
- **In short, *recollection as forgiveness* forges the conceptual link between unalienated *cognition* and unalienated *recognition*.**